Kamis, 05 Februari 2015

Rapid Crack Propagation (RCP): What Does It Mean for PE Gas Pipeline?



Although the PHMSA has noted pipeline safety has improved in recent years, corrosion continues to be a major contributor to pipeline failures, according to the administration. Corrosion could lead to dangerous explosions and fires.

When natural gas pipelines exhibit weaknesses, the pipes may be more prone to corrosion, according to the American Gas Association. Companies may want to be on the lookout for rapid crack propagation (RCP), or when a brittle crack in a material grows and results in fractures, as one of the red flags for pipeline failure, Pipeline and Gas Journal said.

Since the risk of RCP is high for metal pipes, pipeline and utility companies are increasingly choosing durable polyethylene (PE) pipes for upstream and midstream systems.
Rapid Crack Propagation: What Does It Mean for PE Gas Pipeline? The risk of rapid crack propagation (RCP) is high for metal pipes. Durable polyethylene (PE) pipes may be a solution for upstream and midstream systems.

The risk of rapid crack propagation (RCP) is high for metal pipes. Durable polyethylene (PE) pipes may be a solution for upstream and midstream systems.


Why Pipeline Operators Are Choosing PE Pipe

According to Alliance for PE Pipe, PE pipe is not only durable, but it's also flexible. The properties of PE pipe allow this material to withstand corrosion and chemicals while underground.

Since plastic pipes can endure corrosion better than metal, PE is often used for natural gas pipelines because the process used to make PE pipe makes it less prone to leaks.

Utilities could choose PE piping systems when overhauling underground infrastructure, which may protect them from corroded pipes and joints that could lead to leaks, according to the Plastics Pipe Institute (PPI).

"PE pipes, as well as the heat fusion joints in PE piping, greatly resist the propagation of an initial small failure into a large crack—a major reason for the overwhelming preference for PE piping for gas distribution applications," the report by the PPI said. "And, PE piping retains its toughness even at lower temperatures. In addition, PE piping exhibits very high fatigue resistance. Potential damage by repetitive variations inoperating pressure (surges) is highly resisted."
Factors That Raise Risk of RCP

Pipeline and Gas Journal outlined numerous factors that may contribute to the risk for RCP cracks.

One risk is the size of the pipe; the pipe's diameter may influence cracking. The publication notes that as the diameter of the pipe grows, the risk for RCP also increases.

Another factor is the operating temperature of the pipe. Pipeline operators may want to make sure pipes are protected from lower temperatures because frigid conditions could cause RCP.

Pressure is also a significant factor because a pipeline pressure pulse may contribute to RCP. Companies may want to be aware that there is a higher chance of RCP when the stress in the pipe wall rises. In the event RCP occurs, the consequent pressure waves may result in fragmentation, causing pieces to travel at a high velocity and distance.
What to Look for in RCP

When replacing their existing pipeline and underground infrastructure, pipeline operators may want to look out for warning signs that indicate RCP cracks. Although PE pipelines are more durable against such cracks, they also can appear in this type of material.

According to Pipeline and Gas Journal, an RCP crack is usually presented by a sinusoidal crack within the pipe. Other signs of an RCP crack include the crack going into two directions and butt fusion joints, or when cracks are arrested by electrofusion couplers.

As companies determine what is the best pipeline material for their transmission and distribution operations, they should look into PE pipes for their strength and ability to withstand several factors that could lead to RCP.

Although PE is still vulnerable to RCP, there are a variety of ways pipeline operators can prevent these cracks in PE pipes. If operators choose PE pipeline, they should test the pipe for the amount of pressure it can endure to make sure they limit the chance of RCP.

Effective corrosion prevention methods for pipelines

Unprotected pipelines corrode, no matter where the pipeline is. If it’s buried underground, above ground or in water, it’s going to deteriorate. As 60% of our nation’s transmission lines approach their life expectancy of a half century, we’re hearing more and more about pipeline failures. This should not be a surprise. Without implementing safety measures and having a corrosion control program, corrosion makes transporting hazardous material unsafe.
A successful corrosion control program is a never ending practice. It begins with an effective design and installation of the pipeline, executing corrosion control methods, and maintaining and monitoring the lines. Here are some of the methods NACE (National Association of Corrosion Engineers) recommends as part of a successful corrosion control program to protect oil and gas pipelines. With the exception of the last method, three of the four can be used on existing pipelines.
  • Cathodic protection (CP) is a method to control corrosion by using a direct electrical current which neutralizes external corrosion typically associated with metal pipe. It is generally used when a pipeline is buried underground or in water. When executed on a new pipeline, cathodic protection can prevent corrosion from the start. On an older pipeline, cathodic protection can impede existing corrosion of the line.
gas pipeline
  • Coatings and linings are applied to pipelines whether above or below ground and often are used in combination with cathodic protection. (To the right a section of 16” pipe reconditioned with Trenton #1 Wax-Tape and Glas-Wrap. Picture courtesy of Trenton Corporation.)
Another application that is currently getting some attention is the use of fiber-reinforced polymers to strengthen and repair pipelines.
  • Corrosion inhibitors are compounds which when added to the upstream pipeline can inhibit the corrosion of carbon and low-alloy steels which are commonly used because of their cost effectiveness.
  • Pipeline material used will also significantly influence corrosion. Using materials like plastic, stainless steel or special alloys can enhance the lifetime of the pipeline, while steel or steel reinforced concrete is subject to corrosion.
While the nationwide corrosion issue may seem a bit daunting, I thought it was a good time to discuss some technology we currently have which can indefinitely extend the structural life of our pipelines.

Reference : http://www.lincenergysystems.com/linc-energy-blog/entry/effective-corrosion-prevention-methods-for-pipelines#.VNOdCS5CiTw

Subsea Pipeline Tie-in

Introduction
  • The requirements of this subsection are applicable to tie-in operativons using welding or mechanical connectors. The operations can be performed onboard a laying vessel (in which case welding is the preferred method) or underwater.
  •  Tie-in operations by means of hot or cold taps are subject to special consideration and agreement.
  • Operating limit conditions with regard to the seastate, current and vessel movements shall be established. Uncertainty in weather forecast shall be considered.

Tie-in operations above water
  1. The position of the tie-in shall be verified prior to start of operations. A survey shall be performed to establish that the location is free of obstructions and that the seabed conditions will permit the tie-in to be performed as specified.
  2. Lifting and lowering of the pipeline sections shall be analysed to determine the critical parameters and operational criteria for the operation. Critical parameters/operational criteria shall be monitored continuously.
  3. Lifting arrangements and equipment shall be designed taking into account the critical parameters and operational criteria for the operations.
  4. The operation should be monitored to confirm correct configuration of the pipeline sections from the seabed and onto the vessel.
  5. The alignment and position of the tie-in ends shall be within the specified tolerances before completing the tie-in.
  6. Installation of mechanical connectors shall be performed in accordance with the Manufacturer’s procedure. For flanged connections hydraulic bolt tension equipment shall be used. During all handling, lifting and lowering into the final position, open flange faces shall be protected against mechanical damage.
  7. A leak test to an internal pressure not less than the local incidental pressure should be performed for all mechanical connections.
  8. Corrosion protection of the tie-in area shall be performed and inspected in accordance with accepted procedures.
  9. After completion of the tie-in, a survey of the pipeline on both sides of the tie-in, and over a length sufficient to ensure that no damage has occurred, should be performed
  10. It shall be verified that the position of the tie-in is within the target area prior to departure of the vessel from site. The pipeline stability shall be ensured and adequate protection of pipeline provided.
  11. Requirements for dry welding are given in Appendix C.

Tie-in operations below water
  1. In addition to the requirements in Subsection I200, the requirements below are valid for tie-in operations involving underwater activities.
  2. Diving and underwater operations shall be performed in accordance with agreed procedures for normal and contingency situations covering applicable requirements.
  3. Requirements for underwater hyperbaric dry welding are given in Appendix C.
ARTHIT Pipeline End Manifold Tie-In Spool Installation


Reference :
DNV OS F101
http://www.arv-offshore.com/trackrecord/2008/spoolinst1.html

Pipeline Integrity Management

Pipeline Integrity Management is a process for evaluating and reducing pipeline risks. The Pipeline Safety Improvement Act of 2002 required the federal Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Administration (PHMSA) to develop and issue regulations that address risk analysis and integrity management programs (IMP) for pipeline operators. In 2003, PHMSA finalized the IMP regulations which pipeline operators were required to implement the following year. As a result of these regulations, natural gas transmission companies must conduct baseline evaluations of pipe segments within high consequence areas (HCAs) by the end of 2012. HCAs are defined as areas where a gas pipeline failure would have a significant impact on public safety or the environment.

Integrity Management Program:
CenterPoint Energy has implemented a robust IMP to achieve or exceed the requirements mandated by PHMSA. This program builds on an existing foundation of pipeline safety regulations covering design, construction, testing, operation and maintenance - a foundation that was laid many years ago. CenterPoint Energy’s IMP is required for approximately 180 miles of HCA pipeline segments, but we plan to do more. By the end of 2012, the company expects to have evaluated over 2,500 miles of pipelines - over 10 times the amount required by PHMSA.

Our Integrity Management Program consists of seven main steps:
  1. HCA Identification: CenterPoint Energy evaluates population densities each year to determine the HCAs along the pipeline system.
  2. Data Integration: The company gathers and integrates information from historical construction documents, pipeline operating history, and pipeline evaluations.
  3. Risk Analysis: The company then analyzes individual pipeline segments for exposure to threats as well as the public safety and environmental consequences of a pipeline failure.
  4. Evaluation: Using state of the art tools, CenterPoint Energy evaluates the pipeline segments for corrosion, damage or other issues detrimental to the safe operation of the pipeline segment.
  5. Repair: The company then investigates and repairs any issues found during the evaluation step to ensure the pipeline continues to operate safely.
  6. Minimize Risks: The company utilizes data integration, risk analysis, evaluations and repairs to develop actions that can be taken to minimize or eliminate future damage and/or consequences.
  7. Improve: Finally, the company evaluates the IMP for areas of success and looks for other areas on our pipeline system where improvements can be made. We incorporate these improvements into our ongoing safety initiatives and the cycle starts again.
Public Safety:
The ultimate goal of CenterPoint Energy’s IMP is to protect people living, working and playing near our pipelines, as well as protecting the environment surrounding our pipelines. As a direct result of our IMP efforts, CenterPoint Energy has excavated and examined over 2,100 pipeline segments.
  • To combat internal corrosion, we ran over 220 cleaning pigs in 2011 to clean our pipelines, used corrosion inhibitors, and monitored internal corrosion using metal probes.
  • To reduce external corrosion, we use cathodic protection equipment and routinely take test point readings to evaluate the pipeline’s level of protection. We also perform pipeline coating surveys - so far we have covered 3,100 miles of our system and plan to complete the entire system by 2016.
  • To help prevent third party damage we employ pipeline markers, aerial patrols, foot patrols, and right-of-way clearing. In addition, CenterPoint Energy is fully committed to, and participates in, the 8-1-1 Call Before You Dig Program.
Public Awareness:
CenterPoint Energy has a comprehensive Public Awareness program. We dedicate a great deal of time and resources to keeping in contact with both the public and the emergency responders located near our pipelines. Each year we mail hundreds of thousands of information packets to people living near our pipelines. We also have safety meetings with excavation contractors, law enforcement and fire prevention officials. In addition, we send age appropriate educational materials to the schools near our pipelines. It is our goal to partner with the officials dedicated to protecting the public.

Leading Edge:
CenterPoint Energy is a proud participant and supporter of industry efforts to continually improve pipeline safety and reliability. We are a member of Intrastate Natural Gas Association of America (INGAA) and actively participate in the INGAA Integrity Management Continuous Improvement (IMCI) initiative. IMCI has set a goal of zero incidents as one of its guiding principles. Another IMCI goal is to apply integrity management principles on a much larger scale than required by current regulations. CenterPoint Energy supports these INGAA initiatives and participates on IMCI planning teams.
In addition, the company participates in research projects hosted by Pipeline Research Council International, Inc (PRCI). PRCI is dedicated to researching issues and producing solutions that assure safe and reliable pipelines. CenterPoint is a PRCI member company and participates on many PRCI research teams.
CenterPoint Energy believes we are one of the companies leading the pipeline industry to a safer, more reliable future.

Commitment:
CenterPoint Energy is committed to protecting the public and environment. Our dedication to safety is a reflection of our company values: Integrity, Accountability, Initiative and Respect. If you need further information or have additional questions, please contact us at Midstream Pipeline Safety.

Reference : http://www.centerpointenergy.com/services/pipelines/naturalgassafety/pipelineintegritymanagement/

Local analysis of a gas flowline subjected to upheaval buckling

Local analysis of a gas flowline subjected to upheaval buckling
In October 2010, a subsea inspection of flowlines on the MacCulloch field in the North Sea was performed. Several points of upheaval buckling on a flexible flowline were recorded. These observations required evaluation and possibly remedial action. A detailed study showed that only one of the upheaval buckling locations was critical, since the radius of curvature was less than the minimum bending radius (MBR) specified for the flowline by the manufacturer. MARINTEK was requested to perform a detailed analysis of the 4 inch gas-lift flowline, using the estimated bending radius and the current operating conditions. The objective of the study was to investigate the effect of extreme bending beyond the minimum bending radius.
The MacCulloch oil field lies 250 km north-east of Aberdeen on the United Kingdom continental shelf (UKCS) block 15/24b. The field was discovered in 1990 and came on-stream in 1997 using the North Sea Producer FPSO. The field has five active wells. MacCulloch was operated by ConocoPhillips when the subsea inspection was performed.
Many offshore pipelines are required to operate at high temperatures and pressures. A temperature rise results in thermal expansion of the pipeline. Friction forces between the pipe and the seabed restrains the pipeline along its route, which in turn increase axial stress, with the result that buckling may occur. Buckling may have serious consequences for the integrity of the pipeline if not properly taken into account.
A pipeline will tend to buckle in the direction of smallest resistance. The direction of the buckle therefore depends upon the installation and pipe configuration:
  • In a free span the pipe will buckle downwards
  • If it has been installed on the seabed, the pipe will buckle sideways
  • A buried pipe will tend to buckle upwards
Vertical buckling of a pipeline is called upheaval buckling, see Figure 1.
Offshore pipelines are buried for various reasons; for example, in order to:
  • eliminate the risk of trawl gear snagging the pipeline and pulling it out of position. 
  • avoid anchor snagging
  • protect the pipeline from dropped objects near installations
  • protect it from iceberg scouring
  • stabilize pipelines with low submerged weight.
The flowline at the MacCulloch field was buried. Upheaval buckling was observed during a subsea inspection in 2010.
The calculated radius of curvature based on the data provided by the ROV was estimated to approximately half of the minimum bend radius (MBR) allowed for storage defined by the manufacturer of the pipeline, i.e. the bend was more severe than the pipeline design allowed.
In order to evaluate its operability, the operator requested a detailed study of the flowline. The study had two objectives:
  • Global analysis: to understand the mechanism of the observed upheaval buckling and suggest potential remedies to stabilize the flowline
  • Local analysis: Detailed analysis of the cross section to investigate the possible effect of extreme bending beyond minimum bending radius.
The global analysis was performed in SIMLA, which is MARINTEK’s modelling software package for numerical analysis for offshore pipelines in deep waters and hostile environments.
The local model was analysed in MSC.Marc, which is a powerful, general-purpose, nonlinear finite element analysis software package that accurately simulates the response under static, dynamic and multi-physics loading scenarios.
A flexible pipe or flowline usually consist of several layers.
The most usual layers, and their roles, are:
  • Carcass: Provides the pipe with radial support to resist external loads (crushing and hydrostatic pressure)
  • Pressure sheath: Leak-tight barrier
  • Pressure armour: Provides the required radial strength to resist internal pressure
  • Tensile armour: Provides the required axial tensile strength capacity
  • External plastic sheath/Outer sheath: Prevents the steel wires from coming into direct contact with seawater and provides mechanical protection for the outer tensile armour wire layer.
The local model of the MacCulloch flowline was built according to the specification of the flowline cross-section.
The integrity of the flowline was assumed to be critical with respect to the condition of the carcass. For this reason, the carcass was modelled in detail(Figures 6 and 7).
The flowline consists of two helically wound layers of tensile armour wires. Both layers are critical and were also modelled in detail in the FE-model (Figure 8).
The finite element model was built on the basis of methods developed by 4Subsea AS.
The results of the FM analysis showed that the carcass did not collapse at the observed radius of curvature (Figure 9). However, the analysis indicated that the carcass would collapse at a radius of curvature slightly lower (i.e. slightly tighter bending) than the observed radius of curvature, (Figure 10).
The analysis showed that the stresses in the carcass and tensile armour layers were high at the observed radius of curvature. The margin to failure was small; the carcass material was in the plastic region, i.e. stresses beyond the yield limit, the strain in the pressure and outer sheaths was significant, there was high stress in the tensile armour wires, etc. If a probabilistic analysis had been applied to this model, the probability of failure would therefore have been high.
The analysis of the local model employed a one-off loading, and cycling loads were not used. The integrity of the pipe would probably have deteriorated in the course of time due to repeated start-up and shutdowns.
On the basis of the survey data provided by the ROV, the results of the analysis and the probability of failure, MARINTEK recommended replacing the flowline, although it was made clear that any changes to the survey data would affect the results and the conclusions drawn.
Because of the importance of the observed radius of curvature, in early 2012, a more detailed and accurate survey was performed on behalf of ConocoPhillips. The primary objective of this inspection was to accurately determine the radius of curvature of the flow line at the site of the anomaly. The new survey showed that the radius of curvature was much larger than estimated in the first survey (i.e. less critical). It was even above the defined MBR for this flowline. The new observations showed that the requirements specified by the flowline manufacturer were not violated, and replacement of the flowline was not necessary. The anomaly will be closely monitored for any developments in the future.

Reference : http://www.sintef.no/home/MARINTEK/Projects/Oil-and-Gas/Local-analysis-of-a-gas-flowline-subjected-to-upheaval-buckling/

Selection Of Pipe Material For Low-Temperature Service

The selection of material for any specific environment is directly dependent on the material’s properties, especially those properties that are affected by that special environment.
Metal properties are classified in terms of Mechanical, Physical and Chemical properties. These are further subdivided into Structure Sensitive or Structure Insensitive properties. The following table describes these properties.

Table 1: Metal properties.
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In this article, we are concerned only with the structure-sensitive mechanical properties of metal. Metals are favored as a construction material because they offer a combination of mechanical properties that are unique and not found among non-metals. Metals are generally strong and many can be loaded or stressed to very high levels before breaking. One property of metals of interest is their capacity to exhibit a high degree of elastic behavior in their early load-carrying capacity. This is a very important property for effective use of the metal as a construction material. When these metals are loaded beyond their elastic range they exhibit another set of important properties called ductility and toughness. These properties and how they are affected by change in temperature are the point of this article.

Pipeline Steels
We will focus on carbon and low-alloy steels. It may be noted that the bulk of the material that is used in conventional pipeline engineering comes from this generic group. Aptly, it is the ductility and toughness of these metals and how they are affected by the variation of temperature that is our subject. The emphasis is made on the variation under low temperature. For this purpose it is essential to know what is meant by these metal properties and by low temperature. The following definitions are understood by fracture mechanics.
Ductility is defined as the amount of plastic deformation that metal undergoes in resisting the fracture under stress. This is a structure-sensitive property and is affected by the chemical composition.
Toughness is the ability of the metal to deform plastically and absorb energy in the process before fracturing. This mechanical and structure sensitive property is the indicator of how the given metal would fail at the application of stress beyond the capacity of the metal, and whether that failure will be ductile or brittle. Only one assessment of toughness can be made with some reasonable accuracy from ordinary tensile testing, and that is the metal displays either ductile or brittle behavior. From that it can be assumed that the metal displaying little ductility is unlikely to display a ductile failure if stressed beyond its limits. The failure in this case would be brittle.
The temperature of metal is found to have profound influence on the brittle/ductile behavior. The influence of higher temperature on metal behavior is considerable. The rise in temperature is often associated with increased ductility and corresponding lowering of the yield strength. The rupture at elevated temperatures is often intergranular, and little or no deformation of the fractured surface may have occurred. When lowered below room temperature, the propensity for brittle fracture increases.
  • The term fracture is strictly defined as irregular surface that forms when metal is broken into separate parts. If the fracture has propagated only part way in the metal and metal is still in one piece, it is called a crack.
  • A crack is defined as two coincident-free surfaces in a metal that join along a common front called the crack tip, which is usually very sharp.
  • The term fracture is used when the separation in metal occurs at relatively low temperature and metal ductility and toughness performance is the chief topic.
  • The term rupture is more associated with the discussion of metal separation at elevated temperatures.
As noted previously, two basic types of fracture occur in metals: ductile and brittle. These two modes are easily recognized when they occur in exclusion, but fractures in metal often have mixed morphology and that is aptly called mixed mode. The mechanisms that initiate the fracture are shear fracture, cleavage fracture, and intergranular fracture. Only the shear mechanism produces ductile fracture. It may be noted that like the modes discussed here, the failure mechanisms also have no exclusivity.
A crack is defined above as two coincident-free surfaces in a metal that join along a common front called the crack tip, which is usually very sharp. Irrespective of the fracture being ductile or brittle, the fracture process is viewed as having two principal steps:
1. Crack initiation, and
2. Crack propagation.
Knowledge of these two steps is essential as there is a noticeable difference in the amount of energy required to execute them. The relative level of energy required for initiation and for propagation determines the course of events which will occur when the metal is subjected to stress.
There are several aspects to the fracture mechanics that tie in with the subject of metal ductility and toughness but this article is not planned for detailed information on fracture mechanics. Hence, these are not discussed in detail but some specific-related topics are listed in Table 2.

Table 2: Topics related to fracture mechanics.
  • Effects of axiality of stress,
  • Crack arrest theory,
  • Stress intensity representation,
  • Stress gradient,
  • Rate of Strain,
  • Effect of Cyclic Stress,
  • Fatigue Crack,
  • Crack Propagation, (KIc= σ √πa)
  • Griffith’s theory of fracture mechanics,
  • Irwin’s K = √E x G,
  • Crack Surface Displacement Mode,
  • Crack Tip Opening Displacement (CTOD), (BS 5762-1979 and BS 7448 part-I)
  • R-Curve Test methods
  • J- Integral Test method,
  • Linear-Elastic Fracture Mechanics (LEFM) (ASTM E 399),
  • Elastic-Plastic Fracture Mechanics (EPFM),
  • Nil Ductility Temperature (NDT).
Though the topics in Table 2 are not commonly taken into consideration when selecting suitable material for an onshore pipeline, these are essential parts of subsea pipeline and riser technology. In fact, some of the specification (e.g. API 1104, DNV-OS F101 etc.) suggest the use of fracture mechanics to determine the failure behavior of metal in these services.

Returning to our earlier discussion, lowering the temperature of metal profoundly affects fracture behavior. Strength, ductility, toughness and other properties are changed in all metals when they are exposed to temperature near absolute zero. The properties of metals at very low temperatures are of more than casual interest because pipelines, welded pressure equipment and vessels are expected to operate satisfactorily at levels below room temperatures. For example, moderate sub-zero temperatures are imposed on equipment for dewaxing petroleum and for storage of nitrogen, liquefied fuel gases and pipelines.
Much lower temperatures are involved in cryogenic services where metal temperature falls to –100 C (-150 F) and below. The cryogenic service may involve storage of liquefied industrial gases like oxygen and nitrogen. Toward the very bottom of the temperature scale, there is a real challenge for metals that are used in the construction of equipment for producing and containing liquid hydrogen and liquid helium,because these elements in liquefied form are increasingly important in new technologies. Helium in liquefied form is only slightly above absolute zero, which is 1 Kelvin (-273.16 C or – 459.69 F).
Absolute zero (1 K) is the theoretical temperature at which matter has no kinetic energy and atoms no longer exhibit motion. Man has yet to cool any material to absolute zero, so it is unknown how metals would behave when cooled to this boundary condition.
However, metal components have been brought to the temperatures very close to absolute zero, hence it presents a special challenge to metals and welded components as they would be required to serve in this extremely low temperature.
When cooled below room temperature every metal will reach a temperature where the kinetic energy will be reduced to nil. The atoms of the element will move closer and the lattice parameters will become smaller. All these changes would affect the mechanical properties of the metal.

Metal Strength At Low Temperature
As we have seen, as temperature is lowered from room temperature, 75oF (24oC or 297oK), to absolute zero, 1oK, the atoms of an element move closer together by dimensions easily compounded from the coefficient of thermal expansion. Several changes occur as a result of this smaller lattice parameter. For example, the elastic module increases. In general, the tensile strength and yield strength of all materials increase as the temperature is lowered to the nil ductility temperature (NDT) , where the yield and tensile strength are equal (σo = σu). The change in these properties is variable in degree for different metals but change does occur.
When the temperature of low-carbon or low-alloy steel is lowered, the corresponding increase in strength of metals occurs. This is attributed to an increase in resistance to plastic flow. Because plastic flow is strongly dependent upon the nature of the crystalline structure, it would be logical to assume that metals with the same kind of structure would react similarly.
A cautionary note: The material in ASTM A 333 Grades 1,3,4,6,9 and 10 is required to have minimum of 10 ft-lbs absorbed energy (impact values).This is the same as ASTM A 350 LF1, but material ASTM A 350 LF2 and LF3 are required to have minimum of 12 ft-lbs absorbed energy (impact values). This is at any given temperature, respective of that material.

Selecting Material From Specification And Codebooks
There are several ASME/ASTM specifications specifically tailored for low-temperature services, but it is important to check if the specified test temperatures for the metal in use is in tally with the design temperature of the system. ASTM-A/ASME -SA105 is not a low-temperature material; however, it may be used for low temperature if all the other factors are conforming to the requirements and an additional impact test on the material is carried out at a temperature that is in tally with the design temperature.
Similarly, ASTM A 106 pipes (grade A, B or C) must be checked for the test temperatures because ASTM A 106 is specified as “high-temperature” material and rightfully the impact test is not even included in the non-mandatory requirement. The same is the case with ASTM A 105 forged material discussed above. Concerning ASTM A 333 grades 1, 3, 4, 6, 9 and 10 pipes for the acceptable impact values and their test temperatures, the specification must be referenced before arbitrarily using them for any service temperature range. ASTM A 350 LF1 (-20 F), LF2 (-50 F), LF 3 (-150 F) are suitable for low-temperature service to the limits set by the specification, but one should check the specified energy absorption value Cv to ensure it is in tally with the system design parameters.
An informed selection has to be made. There are several boiler-quality plate materials specified by the ASTM specifications and ASME codes but not all are suitable for low-temperature services. Some are so designed metallurgically that they are not suitable for low-temperature service. Plate material conforming to the ASTM A 515 specification is an example. Most of the metals that are fit for low temperature are generally tested to 32oF (0 C) unless specified otherwise. So, the general assumption that all ASME material is good up to -20oF will not be correct, unless it is tested and material test report so declares.
API mandates that PSL2 pipes be tested at 32oF (0 C) or any lower temperature as agreed between the buyer and manufacturer and is expected to have 20 ft-lbf (27 J) absorbed energy. The same is not true for PSL1 pipes. In either case, it is important to determine what was the actual test temperature and what responsibility engineers have to ensure that the test temperature is in tally with the design temperature of the system.
Among pipeliners, a question is often raised if, in designing a buried pipeline, one needs to consider the low temperature. The answer is not metallurgical since it is unrelated to the material property as much as it is geographical and environmental, that is, the design conditions. The data provided by the user (clients) and the specification must be consulted.
Generally, a buried pipeline will not be subject to very low temperatures unless buried in permafrost, so no specific caution beyond the general design considerations would be required. However, the general guidance in such case should be to look at the product properties, risk analysis, product leakage, and will a reduction in pressure at a certain point reduce the temperature to what is considered a low-temperature range.
If there is a cause to expect lower temperature, then determine to what extent lower temperature will occur during the life of service. If the temperature is ever in the critical low range, it will be prudent to identify those conditions and take them into account while selecting the material.

Similar consideration applies to the aboveground pipe and components. Aboveground valves flanges and pipes are more exposed to the weather and are also carrying the similar product. Therefore, they have greater propensity to face low temperature in their service lives. The following questions must be asked and answered: Are they insulated? Are they heated? Is there any possibility of depressurization that would lead to extensive temperature reduction, etc? There is a multiplicity of factors that affect the understanding of the material behavior in extreme stress conditions. All possible factors must be identified and addressed.

Conclusion
The questions we have tried to explore are more complex than this discussion which is an attempt to simplify the basic understanding of the subject. This discussion is intended to bring out the importance of the subject and direct readers to available resources for material selection issues.

Important Additional Information
The sub-ambient temperature dependence of yield strength σo (Rp0.2) and ultimate tensile strength σu in a bcc metal is shown in Figure 1. Consider the graph, the material is ductile until a very low temperature, point A, where Y.S. equals the UTS of the material (σo = σu). Point A represents the NDT temperature for a flaw-free material. The curve BCD represents the fracture strength of a specimen containing a small flaw (a < 0.1mm). The temperature corresponding to point C is the highest temperature at which the fracture strength σf ≈ σo. Thus point C represents the NDT for a specimen with a small flaw.
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The presence of a small flaw raises the NDT of steel by about 200°F (110°C). Increasing the flaw size decreases the fracture stress curve, as in curve EF, until with increasing flaw size a limiting curve of fracture stress HJKL is reached. Below the NDT the limiting safe stress is 5,000-8,000 psi (~35 to 55 MPa).
Above the NDT the stress required for the unstable propagation of a long flaw (JKL) rises sharply with increasing temperature. This is the crack-arrest temperature curve (CAT). The CAT curve defines the highest temperature at which unstable crack propagation can occur at any stress level. Fracture will not occur for any point to the right of the CAT curve.
The temperature above which elastic stresses cannot propagate a crack is the fracture transition elastic (FTE). The temperature defines the FTE, at the point K, when the CAT curve crosses the Yield Strength, σo curve. The fracture transition plastic (FTP) is the temperature where the CAT curve crosses the Ultimate Tensile Strength σu curve (point L). Above this temperature, the material behaves as if it is flaw-free, for any crack, no matter how large, cannot propagate as an unstable fracture.

Reference : http://www.pipelineandgasjournal.com/selection-pipe-material-low-temperature-service-0